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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
The United States bans imports of certain agricultural and wildlife goods that can carry 
pathogens or diseases or whose harvest can threaten wildlife stocks or endanger species. 
Despite these bans, contraband is regularly uncovered in inspections of cargo containers 
and in domestic markets. This study characterizes the economic factors affecting agricul-
tural and wildlife smuggling by drawing on inspection and interdiction data from USDA 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and existing economic literature. Findings reveal 
that agricultural and wildlife smuggling primarily include luxury goods, ethnic foods, 
and specialty goods, such as traditional medicines. Incidents of detected smuggling are 
disproportionately higher for agricultural goods originating in China and for wildlife 
goods originating in Mexico. Fragmentary data show that approximately 1 percent of all 
commercial wildlife shipments to the United States and 0.40 percent of all U.S. wildlife 
imports by value are refused entry and suspected of being smuggled.   
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Summary
The United States bans imports of certain agricultural and wildlife goods 
that may pose unique risks to the environment or the agricultural economy. 
Despite these bans, contraband is regularly discovered during inspections of 
cargo containers and found for sale in domestic markets. Very little is known 
about the size and scope of such smuggling. 
What Is the Issue?
Banned agricultural goods can carry diseases, pathogens, foreign organisms, 
or contaminants that threaten the health of humans, animals, and plants; the 
environment; and the trade status of U.S. exports. Trade in banned wild-
life goods may also endanger the survival of a species. Yet, banned goods 
still appear in U.S. markets. This study examines agricultural and wildlife 
smuggling—its specific characteristics, including estimations of its size and 
scope; its responsiveness to economic incentives; and regulations and efforts 
to reduce its risks.
What Did the Study Find?
Agricultural and wildlife smuggling primarily involves luxury items and 
jewelry made from animal parts; ethnic foods, such as szechuan peppers and 
tropical fruits; and specialty goods, including traditional medicines. These 
types of items are also likely to command high prices relative to their cost 
and size. Small amounts of smuggled goods occasionally move over pedes-
trian and personal vehicle pathways, but commercial volumes of smuggled 
goods are likely to be transported through international shipping channels. 
Among all countries exporting to the United States, incidents of detected 
smuggling are more prevalent with goods shipped from Mexico (wildlife) 
and China (agricultural). However, both countries are major trade partners 
with the United States, and U.S. imports from both have increased dramati-
cally over the last 25 years. Interdictions of meat products are particularly 
high from China. Inspections data reveal that Mexico has the highest amount 
of refused shipments of fruits and vegetables, though it is also the leading 
exporter of these products to the United States. Mexico and Russia have the 
highest rates of refusal of wildlife goods. Refused goods from Mexico typi-
cally include live animals, of which birds are a particular concern due to their 
potential for spreading diseases and pathogens. Differences in smuggling 
prevalence rates across countries are attributed to differences in the types of 
goods affected by trade prohibitions, the visibility of smuggled goods, and 
the targeting of enforcement resources. 
Based on fragmentary inspections data, wildlife smuggling accounts 
for approximately 1 percent of commercial wildlife shipments to the 
United States and 0.4 percent of the total value of U.S. wildlife imports. 
Fragmentary interdiction data show that agricultural smuggling is small, 
accounting for 0.03 percent of total agricultural imports from China, the 
country with the highest reported proportions and volumes of smuggled v 
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imports. Still, these figures, along with most widely reported estimates, are 
inexact due to the potential for bias in the data.
Smuggling is motivated by profits. Criminal penalties and fines represent 
a cost of smuggling, while the difference between the price of a smuggled 
good at its origin and at its (prohibited) destination represents its return. 
Governments may reduce the incentive to smuggle both by increasing the 
cost through higher penalties and tighter enforcement and by reducing its 
return. To reduce price disparities that encourage smuggling, governments 
may compensate producers affected by trade bans and eradication programs, 
ensure that close-substitute goods can gain legal trade access, and reduce the 
size of markets impacted by a trade ban through regionalization. A small but 
growing literature finds empirical support that smuggling responds to incen-
tives related to enforcement, detection, and profitability. 
How Was the Study Conducted?
The analysis is supported by data on random and targeted inspections of agri-
cultural cargo from USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 
interdiction data from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and trade data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. vi 
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Introduction
Between 1998 and 2007, the real values of U.S. agricultural and wildlife 
imports increased 70 percent (Census Bureau) and 108 percent (FWS, 2008), 
respectively. Agricultural and wildlife imports, however, can introduce 
invasive species or disease-carrying pathogens and thus pose unique risks to 
the domestic environment and the agricultural economy. Furthermore, trade 
in certain wildlife goods places pressure on natural stocks abroad and can 
endanger the survival of animal and plant species, including elephants, exotic 
birds, and whales.
To mitigate these risks, regulators rely on trade restrictions allowed under 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Convention 
for the Trade of Endangered Species (CITES). In many cases, specific 
commodities are restricted based on country of origin, destination within 
an importing country, and time of year (for seasonal pests). Enforcement 
of these restrictions is multifaceted. Infrastructure and logistical constraints 
make the complete physical inspection of all imported shipments impractical. 
Instead, inspection occurs at different rates (the percentage of shipments 
actually inspected) and intensities (the proportion of goods in a shipment 
actually physically observed). Even the most thorough enforcement process 
may fail to prevent all restricted goods from entering commercial trade. 
Smuggling, defined as the illegal import of contraband goods, is an ancient 
activity. However, only with the emergence of modern pathology and the 
progressive, environmental, and conservation movements since the late 
19th century have trade restrictions been widely adopted for goods harming 
public health, agricultural productivity, and the environment. These trade 
restrictions and regulations may disproportionately harm some consumers 
by constraining consumption choices or artificially benefit some domestic 
producers if used to mask protectionist measures. International treaties and 
agreements constrain the extent to which the United States may ban agricul-
tural imports without repercussion from trade partners. They also require that 
the United States ban certain wildlife goods. Smuggling circumvents those 
bans and, despite significant resources devoted to enforcement, banned and 
contaminated goods still appear in U.S. markets. Integrated global markets, 
lower transportation costs, and rising incomes have not only increased the 
levels of both total trade and imports but also allowed for the more rapid 
movement of exotic pathogens and plant pests across borders and ecosystems 
and increased the size of potential markets for limited wildlife resources. 
The costs of agricultural and wildlife smuggling are difficult to quantify in 
specific terms. Interpol estimates that the value of the illegal global wildlife 
trade alone ranges between $7 billion and $20 billion annually and cites it as 
the second largest form of illegal trade (Interpol, 2006; 2008).1  
No comparable estimate of the size of agricultural smuggling is available, 
but its consequences are acknowledged to be significant due to the large 
potential risk posed by very small amounts of biological material that may 
enter a country with the smuggled goods. For example, an outbreak of Exotic 
Newcastle Disease among poultry in California in 2003 is thought to have 
1Exact sourcing of Interpol’s reported 
estimates on this figure is unclear.  Ma-
lik et al. (1997), for example, state that 
the total value of all trade in wildlife, 
not just illegal products, is $8 billion to 
$20 billion. 2 
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spread from smuggled game birds from Mexico. As a result, California 
poultry farmers incurred eradication costs of approximately $168 million. A 
2005 shipment of 450 citrus cuttings carrying citrus canker was intercepted 
by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); if the disease had become 
established in the United States, potential costs to the U.S. citrus industry 
have been estimated at between $173 million and $890 million. For invasive 
species, the Office of Technology Assessment estimates the annual costs at 
$4.9 billion (OTA, 1993). During the 1990s, spending on emergency eradica-
tion programs for invasive species in the United States increased from $10.4 
million to $232 million (Lynch and Lichtenberg, 2006). Moreover, the risks 
of wildlife and agricultural smuggling are interrelated as wild plants and 
animals are more likely to carry agriculturally significant pathogens than 
farm-raised animals or to become invasive themselves.2
Based on an analysis of data on shipment inspection and interdiction, this 
study examines the smuggling of agricultural and wildlife goods into the 
United States—including its specific characteristics and its responsiveness to 
economic factors. 
2Karesh et al. (2005) show that 
contact with animals in illegal markets 
substantially encourages transmission 
of wildlife-to-livestock, wildlife-to-
human, and wildlife-to-wildlife dis-
eases, such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, 
(avian) paramyxovirus, monkeypox 
(in rodents), and chytriodiomycosis 
(in wild amphibians).  Reed (2005) 
notes that illegally wild-caught boa 
constrictors are more likely to carry 
zoonotic diseases, such as Salmonella 
on hitchhiking ticks, and that wild spe-
cies are also likely to be more invasive 
if accidentally released in the wild, as 
has happened with boa constrictors in 
the Florida Everglades.  Endangered 
live plants (such as orchids, cacti, and 
cycads) are periodically wild-harvested 
and transported in native soils, which 
might themselves contain a variety of 
invasive species.3 
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The Economics of Agricultural  
and Wildlife Smuggling
According to Naim (2005, p. 239), illicit trade is driven by high profits 
and not low morals. At its core, smuggling is a market phenomenon, and 
trade bans, by their very nature, encourage smuggling. Taxes, tariffs, and 
trade restrictions create gaps between the price that sellers receive and the 
price that buyers pay, the difference of which is the return to smuggling. 
Illicit trade is self-reinforcing because reductions in smuggling increase 
its profitability. The lost trade from this market disequilibrium represents 
that maximum amount of goods that might be smuggled in the absence of 
enforcement or legal penalty (Ferrier, 2008).  
A Model of Smuggling 
The market incentive for smuggling is the disparity between the price of 
a good at its origin and destination. Price disparities have been shown 
to encourage smuggling in the work of Fisman and Wei (2004) for tariff 
evasion generally; Thursby et al. (1991), Saba et al. (1995), and Goel 
(2004) for cigarettes; and Golub and Mbaye (2007) for sugar, wheat, and 
rice. A weak rule of law can lower the probability of penalty or apprehen-
sion and encourage smuggling as shown by Ivanova (2007) for ozone-
depleting substances and Fisman and Wei (2004) for artwork. Von Hippel 
and Von Hippel (2002) show that the presence of substitutes, which may 
reduce demand and make it more elastic, also reduces smuggling in the 
case of wildlife goods. Yang (2008) shows that methods of smuggling to 
evade tariffs in the Philippines adjust when changes are made to inspec-
tion-targeting regimes. 
In Ferrier’s (2008) model of the illicit agricultural and wildlife trades, 
demand for smuggled goods is developed from trade theory while the supply 
of smuggled goods is developed from the economic model of crime first 
posed by Becker (1968). Several importers and exporters engage in competi-
tive free trade (with several countries of origin exporting to one destination) 
and the price of traded goods differs only by transit costs. A trade ban for 
a single country of origin restricts that country’s exports so that its markets 
would transact under autarky if no smuggling occurred. Figure 1 depicts 
a market where two origin markets export to a single destination. Under 
free trade, prices net of transit costs across the three markets are equal and 
the sum of exports from origins one and two is equal to total imports to the 
destination. When a trade ban blocks imports from origin one to the destina-
tion market, prices rise in both the destination and the (unrestricted) origin 
two from  1
FT P  and  3
FT P  to  1
TB P  and  3
TB P , simultaneously raising origin two’s 
exports and lowering the destination’s total imports, until an equilibrium 
is reached where these two values are equal. Simultaneously, prices fall in 
origin one from  2
FT P  to  2
TB P , where no exports occur. With the ban in place, 
a wedge emerges between the price at which a good is sold in origin one 
and the price at which a good is purchased in the destination market (net of 
transit costs). This price wedge represents the return to successful smug-
gling. The magnitude of the price wedge will influence its prevalence, and 
its size depends critically on several observable market factors, including 
market size, the magnitude of trade flow, the number of trade partners, and, 4 
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most importantly, the relative elasticities of supply and demand. Generally, 
more inelastic supply and demand in the restricted origin leads to a larger 
price decrease, while more inelastic supply and demand in the remaining 
free trade areas leads to larger price increases. The price effects are not 
symmetric, however. A small number of trade partners in the free-trade area 
with elastic supply and demand can sufficiently adjust production to replace 
the lost supply of imports and mitigate price swings. In the restricted origin, 
the lack of alternative outlets for excess supply results in large extended 
price decreases. Goods likely to have inelastic demand include ethnic foods 
(certain spices, ethnic specialty goods), luxury food items (caviar), and 
medicinal items. As discussed later, the data show that these goods are all 
intercepted regularly. 
The supply of smuggled goods depends on the willingness of risk-averse 
agents faced with an uncertain payoff to supply criminal trading services. 
Given the level of fines and the probability of apprehension, some level 
of fine makes traders indifferent in choosing to earn the lower price at the 
restricted origin or the higher price at the destination with the probability 
of incurring a fine and forfeiture of goods. In general, as the price wedge 
between the restricted origin and the destination increases, traders will 
smuggle goods in larger quantities. As more goods are smuggled, the price 
disparity falls. An equilibrium occurs when the increased amount of smug-
gling lowers the price disparity to make traders indifferent to smuggling 
additional goods abroad or selling in the legal, but lower priced, domestic 
market. Compensation to producers affected by trade bans and eradication 
programs, encouragement of the development of acceptable close substitute 
goods, and reductions in the size of markets impacted by trade bans through 
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Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service.
The free trade and trade ban equilibrium5 
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Economic Literature on Smuggling   
More generally, economists have typically considered several interrelated 
questions with regard to smuggling. First, what are the costs of smuggling 
and is smuggling ever beneficial to society?  Given the historical orientation 
of countries toward protectionist trade restrictions, economists (Bhagwati and 
Hensen, 1973; Kemp, 1976; Norton, 1988; and Martin and Panagariya, 1984) 
have typically approached smuggling without consideration for externalities, 
—situations in which a market transaction imparts a cost or benefit to another 
individual in a way not reflected in market prices. On this score, smuggling is 
typically found to improve aggregate societal welfare as it moves the market 
closer to its efficient equilibrium occurring under free trade. 
However, when restricted goods impart risks to security, public health, or the 
environment, smuggled goods create externalities. For example, smuggled 
goods can potentially introduce foreign plant diseases or pests that reduce 
agricultural productivity or require expensive eradication measures. These 
costs may be difficult to quantify, depending on the risk of the contraband 
goods entering the country, the amount entering, and the uncertain costs 
that will result if a pest becomes established. For wildlife goods, smuggling 
can endanger the survival of a species, entailing a loss of biodiversity and 
aesthetic beauty that is not easily quantified.3 Because agricultural and wild-
life smuggling involves external costs, it differs substantially from ordinary 
tariff-avoiding smuggling, in which the harm is measured as the lost revenue 
from the proportion of goods smuggled. The harm of agricultural and wildlife 
smuggling, alternatively, may increase exponentially with the proportion of 
goods smuggled if foreign pests are more likely to become established with 
larger exposure or if threatened species are more likely to become extinct as 
a result of increased poaching. Moreover, an increased volume of imports 
would require a falling proportion of goods smuggled simply to maintain the 
status quo level of exposure to smuggling’s associated risks. Concern and 
regulation surrounding agricultural and wildlife smuggling may arise from 
human health effects, where the presence of smuggled goods lowers demand 
for legal goods (if, for example, smuggled goods present a health risk),4 and 
stigma effects, where the underlying demand for an illegally traded good may 
fall due to social pressure.5
Other questions considered by economists include the following: how much 
smuggling occurs and how much does smuggling respond to market forces? 
Undoubtedly, trade restrictions foster smuggling. Little is known about the 
illicit agricultural and wildlife trade specifically, relative to other types of 
illicit trade. Significant differences in the patterns of illegal trade may emerge 
for two reasons. First, most agricultural and some wildlife goods are likely to 
be sold in ordinary commercial outlets operating otherwise legally rather than 
in concealed clandestine outlets (illegal markets).6 Second, most agricultural 
and some wildlife goods have both legal and illegal sources. Identifying the 
relative proportion of legal and illegal trade is challenging due to the possible 
endogenous nature of enforcement. If contraband is sold in small quantities 
in legal markets, personnel in interdiction and inspection may be unaware of 
its occurrence. Alternatively, if contraband is sold openly and is commonly 
available, inspection and enforcement efforts may be limited in their effec-
tiveness because complete enforcement is difficult. 
5Fischer (2004; 2003), Von Kooten 
(2006), and Heltberg (2001) all address 
stigma effects in their discussion of the 
illegal wildlife trade. 
6Henry (2004) finds that approxi-
mately 50 percent of selected stores 
surveyed offered traditional Chinese 
medicines,  products for medical use 
labeled as containing animal parts con-
trolled under CITES or the Endangered 
Species Act.  
4Health effects are likely to oc-
cur with meats, such as beef from 
countries with bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) and poultry 
from countries with avian influenza. 
For plant products, most pests are not a 
threat to human health. Contamination 
and adulteration risk, primarily under 
the domain of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, is still likely here, but 
these goods are more likely to be sold 
fraudulently rather than be smuggled 
(in an informed two-party transaction). 
3CITES and most sources on the 
illegal trade assume that smuggling is 
harmful prima facie. Hutton (2000), 
Martin (2000), Kremer and Morcom 
(2000), and Malik et al. (1997) argue 
that freer, sanctioned trade will create 
better incentives for developing coun-
tries to preserve sustainable harvests of 
wildlife in specific cases.  This argument 
does not support illegal trade but argues 
for reduction in trade prohibitions.6 
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Regulation 
With regard to the risks posed by imports of agricultural and wildlife goods, 
the government performs three basic functions—regulation, to establish 
the conditions for legitimate imports, including treatments and product 
requirements; inspection, to ensure that those imports satisfy regulations; 
and interdiction, to recover illegally imported material and enforce subse-
quent penalties. Over time, separate Federal Government agencies emerged 
to address the regulation, inspection, and interdiction of U.S. imports for 
different types of risk (see box, “The Evolving Regulatory Structure”). After 
2003, agricultural inspection operations (for invasive species) were moved 
to the newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security, while regula-
tory and interdiction authority of agricultural goods remained with USDA’s 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). All three functions—
regulation, inspection, and interdiction—of wildlife goods remained with the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 
Domestically, the Plant Protection Act of 2000 and the Animal Health 
Protection Act of 2002 delegate to APHIS the authority to promulgate 
SPS-based trade restrictions. The laws also designate APHIS as the scientific 
authority in cases where the restrictions are challenged by U.S. trade partners. 
For example, disputes may arise over the degree to which an invasive species 
is already established in a country. If a country already has an established 
pest that is actively controlled, the importing country may not ban trade based 
on that pest threat. Similarly, APHIS provides evidence to trade partners to 
defend U.S. exporters against unfounded claims that U.S. goods may carry a 
disease or pathogen. Internationally, the 1995 Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures governs disputes over claims that SPS 
restrictions violate free trade commitments under the General Agreement of 
Trade and Tariffs.7 This agreement requires that trade restrictions designed 
to mitigate SPS risks follow two broad principles—that they not be used to 
disguise protectionism, and that the restrictions not be arbitrary or discrimina-
tory. Evidence of harm and scientific risk assessment must be provided by an 
importing country to justify a restriction if challenged. If fumigation or cold 
treatment by an exporting country mitigates a pest risk or if certain exporting 
regions within a country can be determined to be pest free, then programs are 
to be put in place that address the remaining risk without halting all trade. 
The harm from the importation of banned wildlife goods (that is, species 
loss or endangerment) is more diffuse, but certainly falls more squarely 
on the exporting country as species loss can result in less revenue from 
ongoing trade and tourism and the loss of a country’s ecological distinc-
tiveness. International treaties, therefore, are oriented toward enforcing 
restrictions on imports determined collectively by member countries. The 
primary U.S. law regulating wildlife imports is the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA), which is also the enabling legislation for U.S. participation in 
CITES.8 CITES, however, also explicitly allows member states the discre-
tion to enact “stricter domestic measures.” As a result, imports of certain 
species restricted by ESA are not restricted by CITES.9 Countries enacting 
discretionary restrictions of wildlife goods have occasionally been accused 
of being protectionist (Hutton, 2000).
7Members of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) can 
appeal cases to NAFTA’s independent 
dispute resolution mechanism before 
going to the World Trade Organization.
9The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade contains similar language al-
lowing member countries to enact trade 
restrictions necessary for “conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources” while 
also requiring that they be nondis-
criminatory. See Howse (2002) for a 
discussion of whether restrictions may 
be applied to production methods.
8The Lacey Act prohibiting “the 
import, export, transportation, sale, 
receipt, acquisition, or purchase of fish, 
wildlife, or plants taken, possessed, 
transported, or sold in violation of any 
Federal, State, tribal, or foreign law” 
is also typically invoked when illegal 
trade is actually uncovered.7 
The Economics of Agricultural and Wildlife Smuggling / ERR-81  
Economic Research Service/USDA
CITES has three appendices that proscribe wildlife trade to different extents. 
Species listed in CITES appendix I are banned from trade entirely. Countries 
can transfer these species across borders only if the destination is a verified 
scientific institution or if the species was raised in captivity. Species listed 
in CITES appendix II can be traded only if the exporting country issues a 
certificate of origin and obtains a permit certifying that the product’s harvest 
was not detrimental to the country’s wild stock. Species listed in CITES 
appendix III can be traded only if all participating CITES members issue a 
certificate of origin to document that their exports are not from the country 
where the wildlife is threatened. The listing country must issue a permit certi-
fying nondetrimental harvest. An exporting country may unilaterally add a 
species to CITES appendix III. Among all countries, CITES requirements are 
typically more important but also more burdensome for poor countries that 
have larger undeveloped regions and greater stocks of highly valuable but 
endangered wildlife. Relative to developed countries, these poorer countries 
have more limited infrastructure to enforce harvest regulation, higher returns 
to illicit exports, and fewer alternative industries for employment. 
The Evolving Regulatory Structure 
Prior to 2003, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
performed regulatory, inspection, and interdiction functions for U.S. agricultural 
imports.  After 2003, the agency’s inspection responsibilities were consolidated 
into the newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  APHIS 
retained  its  regulatory  responsibilities  for  assessing  pest  risk,  setting  import 
protocols, and prohibiting certain goods from entering the country. 
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, information sharing 
across inspections functions was seen as essential for a comprehensive approach 
to addressing immediate risk.  Customs and Border Protection, under DHS, would 
inspect imports posing immediate threats, while other existing agencies would 
inspect goods posing other, but not necessarily immediate, risks.  For this reason, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior retained 
both its regulatory and inspection responsibilities for most wildlife, except for 
some live plants and fish.  Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services both regulates and inspects 
agricultural products  for  pathogens and  adulterants by  testing  and  approving 
pharmaceutical drugs, pesticides, and food production methods for their safety 
and  effectiveness  and  by  sampling  cargo  containers  for  proscribed  material 
and contaminants.  However, the Customs Service (previously under the U.S. 
Department of Treasury), which inspects imports for tariff assessment, property 
rights violations, illegal weapons and narcotics, and other restricted trade, was 
also moved to Customs and Border Protection under DHS. 8 
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Methods of Smuggling
Small amounts of smuggled goods occasionally move over pedestrian and 
personal vehicle pathways, but commercial volumes of smuggled goods are 
likely to be transported through international shipping channels. To this end, 
cargo manifests can be falsified so that the product or country of origin is 
misrepresented or goods can be trans-shipped through countries that do not 
prohibit imports of the goods (APHIS, 2006). For example, Mexico allows 
grape imports from Chile as long as the grapes are free of fruit flies, but the 
United States requires imports of the same Chilean grapes to be fumigated 
with methyl bromide. However, U.S. imports of Mexican grapes can enter 
without treatment (Meissner et al., 2003, pg. 122). Trans-shipping of grapes 
would involve moving Chilean grapes through Mexico into the United States 
to misrepresent them as being of Mexican origin and avoid additional fumi-
gation expenses. Similarly, nursery stock from China must remain in Canada 
for a year before it can be exported to the United States as a Canadian 
product. Trans-shipping would involve moving the foreign nursery stock into 
the United States via another country as a way to sidestep the waiting period. 
Hansen (2000, pp. 175-80) documents how collectors and researchers of rare 
orchids use trans-shipping to bypass CITES-based import restrictions.   
More commonly, though, importers smuggle goods by incorrectly identi-
fying contraband on cargo manifests. Prohibited agricultural goods may be 
relabeled as permitted goods, or endangered wildlife goods may be labeled 
as a nonthreatened species. For example, in 2004, APHIS found a prohib-
ited shipment of frozen chicken feet from China that was labeled as frozen 
fish. CITES appendix I lists the entire orchid family and the parrot family, 
with the exception of three varieties, to help prevent the endangered family 
members from being “mismanifested” as similar looking but nonthreatened 
species (Roe et al., 2002, p. 27; Hansen 2000). Mismanifesting exploits 
the difficulties of physically inspecting cargo containers that are large and 
require space to unpack, especially if the cargo is refrigerated and labeled in 
a foreign language.
Whether goods are smuggled into the United States for commercial or 
personal purposes is directly relevant to the enforcement of trade regulations. 
Travelers smuggling goods for personal purposes may not readily recog-
nize the extent of the trade prohibitions or the potential fines. Commercial 
importers, on the other hand, must submit manifests detailing the contents of 
shipping containers, interact more regularly with trade channels, and gener-
ally have obvious incentives to become knowledgeable with regulations. 
Criminal violations under the Endangered Species Act, the Plant Protection 
Act, and the Animal Health Protection Act may be punishable by fines 
ranging from $1,000 to $50,000 per occurrence, a year in prison, and the loss 
of the cargo. 9 
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Estimating the Size of Smuggling With Inspections Data
Smugglers seek to avoid discovery, which severely complicates any estima-
tion of the size of smuggling and its responsiveness to regulatory policy. In 
theory, smuggling is revealed by inspection if three conditions are met. First, 
all cargo must enter the country through known, legal channels; second, all 
cargo must be inspected; and third, inspections must reveal perfectly whether 
imports are illegal. Because smuggled agricultural goods earn only modest 
markups and are difficult to transport, only a small portion are likely to arrive 
in noncargo conveyances that circumvent inspection points. This may not 
be the case for some wildlife goods (e.g., exotic parrots), which earn large 
returns. Agricultural smuggling is likely to go undetected owing to weak-
nesses in inspections involving the second and third conditions. Regulatory 
agencies can inspect all cargo entering the United States comprehensively, 
but it is prohibitively costly to do so. Comprehensive inspection may require 
several hours to unpack cargo containers (which may be refrigerated) and 
overwhelm the capacity of inspectors to process cargo (CBP, 2007b). Thus, 
some unregulated cargo is not inspected.10 Moreover, even inspected cargo 
may contain unrevealed smuggled goods. The intent to smuggle goods may 
be unclear when goods are imported as when the documentation of a wildlife 
good’s origin or an agricultural good’s phytosanitary certificate is missing. 
More significantly, inspections occur with different levels of intensity. Less 
rigorous inspections may not always detect smuggling, especially when 
oriented toward detecting pest infestations rather than smuggling, and may 
involve only sampling or a visual inspection. 
Despite these shortcomings in the inspection process and the potential for 
biases, this study’s estimation of the size of smuggling is based in large 
part on data gathered in the inspection process depicted in figure 2 (see box, 
“Alternative Methods for Estimating the Size of Smuggling”). As shown in 
the figure, producers ship goods to a foreign port of disembarkation. Entry 
of these goods into the United States may require certification of a particular 
production process. For example, meats shipped from countries that have 
experienced outbreaks of BSE require a certificate of origin and a health or 
inspection certificate; wildlife sales may require similar certificates of origin 
and nondetrimental harvest. On average, international agricultural shipments 
require 46 separate documents (AMS, 2004, p. 16).
For U.S. imports, regulated cargo must be inspected for pest risk in the 
United States or abroad before being released. Goods found with pests are 
treated, destroyed, or re-exported to another country. When inspectors find a 
prohibited good or a good containing a pest, they issue an Emergency Action 
Notice (EAN) to legally document the pest and mitigating actions as well as 
inform other ports of the potential risk. Goods released for sale in the United 
States are then entered into customs data, and importers pay applicable 
duties. Having cleared CBP, the first line of U.S. inspections, the goods may 
undergo further inspection by FWS (in the case of wildlife goods), the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, or other regulatory agencies. 
10Generally, regulated agricultural 
cargo must be inspected for pest risk 
to enter the United States, whereas 
unregulated cargo and cargo entering 
under the National Agricultural Release 
Program does not.  Obviously, cargo 
that would be prohibited can be mis-
manifested as unregulated cargo.10 
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In addition to undergoing targeted inspections, goods are inspected randomly 
under the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring Program (AQIM). 
Inspections data, covering both random and targeted inspections, represent 
the most comprehensive source of information on illegally imported goods. 
Other sources of data include the Pest ID data system, which records how 
pests found in shipments were identified, and the EAN database, which docu-
ments the alerts issued for the detection of prohibited goods or goods with 
pests. In all, four separate databases—PPQ 280 (USDA’s record of agricul-
tural cargo inspections outcomes), AQIM, Pest ID, and EAN—along with the 
Work Activities Data System (WADS) make up the Agricultural Quarantine 
Activities System (AQAS). This system is the primary tool for analysis of the 
risk posed by agricultural imports. USDA and CBP collect and share the data 
in real time. 
Alternative Methods for Estimating  
the Size of Smuggling
Alternative methods for estimating the size of smuggling or its responsiveness to 
economic factors include those leveraging traceback data, those examining trade 
flow (or consumption ) disparities, and those isolating the effect of anti-smuggling 
measures on stock prices.  Traceback data are essentially an extremely rigorous 
inspection tool that helps determine the true origin or protected status of a good.   
For example, elephant tusks can be traced back to where they were harvested 
to determine whether they were poached.  Random samples of ivory for sale 
can be traced to help estimate the percentage of ivory that is illegally harvested. 
This method has primarily been used with endangered species, including whales 
(Dalebout et al., 2002), seals (Malik et al., 1997), elephants (Wasser et al., 2004), 
and agricultural goods, such as peanuts, coffee, and garlic (Ryan, 1998).  
Trade flows are often documented by both the country importing a good and the 
country exporting a good.  Trade flow disparities arise when imports and exports 
do not match.  Ordinarily, random discrepancies may result from innocuous data 
collection errors, but systematic disparity may suggest that one country may be 
concealing the actual volume of trade.  Using data on trade flow disparities, Fisman 
and Wei (2004) found evidence that smuggling is used to evade tariffs on goods 
entering China from Hong Kong and that smuggling is larger for higher value 
goods and for goods in categories with similar-looking substitutes with lower 
tariffs that might be mismanifested. Similar methods of detecting smuggling have 
been employed by Golub and Mbaye (2007) for sugar, wheat, and rice; and by 
Thursby et al. (1991), Saba et al. (1995), and Goel (2004) for cigarettes.  In each 
application, substantial amounts of goods are smuggled from specific geographic 
areas and traded between a relatively limited number of partners. 
Law-abiding companies will see their stock prices fall when embargoes are placed 
on their goods or  when anti-smuggling measures are strengthened.  Alternatively, 
under these conditions, companies that smuggle will see their stock prices rise as 
the restrictions widen or extend the time period of the price wedge.  DellaVigna 
and LaFerrara (2007) show mixed findings on the sensitivity of stock prices of 
weapons-producing companies that differ in their likeliness to smuggle in the face 
of U.N. embargoes on weapons sales to areas of civil conflict. 12 
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Analysis of Agricultural and  
Wildlife Smuggling
Most analyses of illegal trade suffer from incomplete data, and, therefore, esti-
mates of the size of illegal agricultural trade are subject to a great deal of error. 
For example, a TRAFFIC11 source in Roe et al. (2002, pp. 10-12) writes: 
  Any effort to describe the international wildlife trade must unfor- 
  tunately begin with the recognition that this cannot be done with  
  any accuracy. 
and
  The true size of the illegal (wildlife) trade is anyone’s guess. 
Similarly, FWS (2005, p. 2) writes that:
  . . . though enforcement personnel know a great deal about what  
  illegal trade activities occur locally, there is less understanding of  
  illegal trade activity nationally, or what might be occurring at  
  other ports that could influence how interdiction efforts could be  
  improved locally.
USDA has no official estimate of the total scope of agricultural smuggling. 
Severe methodological challenges complicate the estimation of illegal agri-
cultural and wildlife trade with current data sources and limit the extent to 
which it can be characterized in an unbiased manner. 
Analysis of USDA Random Inspections Data 
USDA uses the AQIM program to improve the targeting of agricultural 
inspections and to assess the effectiveness of specific port operations. Under 
program protocol, ports are designated to randomly inspect certain goods 
received in large numbers and record the cargo’s content, port of entry, 
origins, shipment contents, inspection method, pests found, and any indi-
cations of smuggling. AQIM inspections vary in levels of intensity. For 
example, an inspector might observe only the tailgate of a shipping container 
or truck, a proportion of the boxes drawn in a random sample, the entire 
contents of a part of the container, or the entire container’s contents. These 
alternative methods of inspection may not reveal smuggling when it occurs. 
AQIM data have other limitations. First, many AQIM inspections involve 
goods that are not specifically agricultural, including floor tiles, machine 
parts, and wood packing material. Trade restrictions on these goods make 
them unlikely candidates for smuggling or for providing cover for other 
illicitly traded agricultural goods.12 Second, AQIM inspections may not 
reveal smuggling even when performed correctly at the most rigorous level, 
especially in the case of goods having moved in trans-shipment. Also, actual 
inspection may be targeted toward the generally regular inspection goal of 
uncovering pests rather than smuggled goods. Third, AQIM inspections do 
not cover all agricultural goods, including, for example, meats. Fourth, a 
recent Government report indicates that some AQIM inspections in this time 
period may not have been conducted and recorded correctly (see OIG, 2007).
11TRAFFIC is a joint program of 
the World Wildlife Fund and the World 
Conservation Union.
12Because machine parts and floor tile 
have carried hitchhiker pests in the past, 
they are randomly inspected for compli-
ance with packaging protocols. The 
cargo containers carrying these goods 
are not refrigerated and are therefore 
unlikely to be suitable for the transporta-
tion of most agricultural goods.13 
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Based on AQIM data (obtained through an interagency agreement with 
APHIS), inspections rarely revealed smuggling between March 2003 and 
January 2007. Smuggling was detected only once in 4,605 inspections of 
southern U.S. border cargo, twice in 4,894 inspections of manufactured goods, 
and zero times in the 2,473 inspections of air cargo and 2,858 inspections of 
northern U.S. border cargo. Given the infrequent detection of smuggling, little 
inference can be made surrounding the scope of agricultural smuggling from 
these data, although random sampling methods have been used successfully 
elsewhere.13
Analysis of USDA Interdiction Data 
Interdiction refers to the detection of illicitly traded goods in markets after 
they have entered the United States. While large resources are expended 
on the interdiction of narcotics and guns, far less is devoted exclusively to 
interdiction of illegally traded agricultural and wildlife goods. The APHIS 
Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC) group comprises 
approximately 110 employees nationally who serve to recover goods that 
represent an SPS risk and have entered the U.S. supply chain. SITC pros-
ecutes violators either through administrative or criminal punishments. In 
some cases, SITC focuses its efforts on recovering risky material, such as 
Spanish floor tile in wood packing material that was found to contain harmful 
wood-boring beetles in 2004. In these cases, no criminal intent is presumed. 
Data on criminal interdiction are published in SITC’s internal quarterly 
reports for the period 2002-06 and were obtained through interagency agree-
ment with APHIS. These reports record each seizure by type, quantity, cate-
gory, relevant Code of Federal Regulations violation for which the smuggler 
was penalized, and estimated value. Four types of goods are classified in the 
data: Animal and Meat Products,14 Other Plant Products, Fruit Products, and 
Federal Noxious Weeds. Over the data-collection period, SITC expanded in 
size and budget and, subsequently, the number of interdictions also increased. 
Based on the data alone, it is difficult to determine whether interdicted goods 
are being sold in a commercial setting or used for personal consumption. 
For this reason, shipments valued at less than $50 were excluded from the 
following analysis.
Interdiction data are not random. Agents may target higher risk goods or 
exploit criminal networks, and they face administrative pressures to monitor 
certain goods more closely. As a result, data are likely to be biased toward 
easily observed, restricted goods that are obviously banned rather than goods 
that are regionally prohibited or easily misrepresented. Interdiction data are 
collected as part of ongoing interdiction efforts, and agents collect as much 
prohibited material as possible. 
Tables 1-4 present interdiction data for the top five countries in each of 
these categories based on the number of interdictions between fiscal years 
2002 and 2006. For the Fruit Products category and the Other Plant Products 
category, the three most commonly interdicted products for each country are 
identified. For Animal and Meat Products and Federal Noxious Weed catego-
ries, there is little difference across countries with regard to the types of iden-
tified goods.   
13Specifically, Jacob and Levitt 
(2003) used the method for re-testing 
and Feinstein (1999) used the method 
for auditing.
14The Animal Products and Meat 
Products categories were combined 
from the original data because their 
goods overlapped significantly.14 
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In the Animal and Meat Products category, the data distinguish between 
pork, beef, poultry, or egg products with different levels of detail. Interdicted 
meat imports were particularly large from China, Japan, Korea, and India 
(table 1). Alternatively, the low monetary value of interdictions from Mexico 
suggests that shipments might have been oriented toward individual personal 
consumption (rather than distribution), which APHIS staff indicate is 
common prior to holidays when immigrants bring specialty meats across the 
southern U.S. border. For the Fruit Products category, interdictions were also 
high with imports from Mexico, China, and Thailand (table 2). 
For the Other Plant Products category, China has a disproportionately high 
number of interdictions, primarily involving shipments of szechuan pepper 
and citrus-based spice (table 3). Both of these goods may carry a variety of 
diseases that threaten citrus fruit, which has been an area of specialized focus 
following an outbreak of citrus canker in Florida in the late 1990s. 
SITC interdiction data reveal a high likelihood for interdicted goods to be 
nontraditional, ethnic goods (specifically, spices) and to have a high value 
relative to their size. This was evident in the Animal and Meat Products, 
Fruit Products, and Other Plant Products categories. Avocados represent an 
exception to this tendency, which is likely due to heightened political atten-
tion to avocado imports as trade of this product was liberalized over the 
period in question (APHIS, 2006).  
Table 2
Fruit product interdictions by SITC, 5-year totals (FY 2002-06)
Rank  Country of origin Frequency  Value  Weight  Top three items
Number Dollars Pounds
1 Mexico 60 94,426 69,840 Tejocotes, avocados, hog plums
2 China 32 75,044 39,437 Bael fruit, garlic,1 ya pears
3 Thailand 26 8,047 2,776 Bael fruit, wood apple, krasang
4 Bangladesh 9 7,677 2,110 Satakora, citrus 
5 Asia (unkown) 7 18,468 9,522 Citrus, longans, wood apple
  Total 190 556,447 209,049 Bael fruit, tejocotes, avocados
1In response to concerns that China was dumping low-priced garlic, the United States imposed a 377-percent tariff on Chinese garlic.  
Subsequently, interdictions periodically uncover trans-shipments of Chinese garlic (Kane, 2004).
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade 
Compliance (SITC) Quarterly Report (2002-06).
Table 1
Animal and meat product interdictions by SITC,  
5-year totals (FY 2002-06)
Rank  Country of origin Frequency  Value  Weight 
Number Dollars Pounds
1 China 175 866,151 262,920
2 Japan 60 355,056 36,888
3 Korea 44 150,111 22,843
4 Mexico 44 17,473 4,867
5 India 42 165,031 70,286
Total 861 3,374,009 1,073,207
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC) Quarterly Report (2002-06).15
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Only a limited number of goods are considered Federal Noxious Weeds, 
a designation that indicates that the good’s establishment and propagation 
make it an environmental threat by itself. For the countries in table 4, the 
top three goods for each were solanum torvum (turkey berry), imperata 
cylindrical (cogongrass, an ornamental grass), and ipomea aquatica (water 
spinach). Domestic transport accounts for a large share of Federal Noxious 
Weed interdictions, suggesting that internal trade is present. Given the infre-
quency of interdictions from Mexico and Vietnam, these observations are 
likely to be anomalous. 
In terms of absolute monetary value, China is the largest source of inter-
dicted material for trade, a ﬁ  nding that bears out over several product cate-
gories (table 5). In terms of the value of interdicted goods to its legal trade, 
China also has the largest percentage15 of interdicted trade to legal trade 
(0.03 percent of total value), although the amount is not inordinately large 
relative to that for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although the percent-
ages from each of the top 10 origin countries are small, it is important to 
15Ivanova (2007) similarly ﬁ  nds that 
China is the largest source of illicit 
traded ozone-depleting substances pro-
hibited under international agreement.
Table 4
Federal noxious weed interdictions by SITC, 5-year totals (FY 2002-06)
Rank 
Country of 
origin  Frequency Value  Weight
Number Dollars Pounds
1 China 56 319,281 26,470
2 U.S. (domestic) 52 100,453 18,542
3 Thailand 29 46,505 9,743
4 Mexico 8 6,175 656
5 Vietnam 7 1,127 179
 Total 180 482,114 58,994
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using APHIS-SITC Quarterly Report (2002-06).
Table 3
Other plant product interdictions by SITC, 5-year totals (FY 2002-06)
Rank 
Country of 
origin  Frequency  Value  Weight Top three items
Number Dollars Pounds
1 China 338 1,169,561 801,332 Szechuan pepper, 
citrus-based spice, 
burdock 
2 India 140 116,842 51,895 Corn/millet, 
citrus-based spice, 
curcurbit
3 Mexico 125 192,462 33,098 Citrus-based spice, 
lemon grass, ruda
4 Thailand 64 69,263 71,932 Citrus-based spice, cit-
rus, szechuan pepper
5 Korea 33 154,017 74,585 Corn/millet, lentil and 
citrus-based spice
 Total 897 2,193,803 1,170,664 Szechuan  pepper, 
corn/millet, citrus 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC) Quarterly Report (2002-06).16
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recognize that this ﬁ  gure represents only a minimum level because the 
interdiction process almost certainly fails to uncover all smuggled goods. 
Moreover, certain factors may help explain why these countries have 
higher detected levels of smuggling. 
Asian countries, particularly China, have recently been recognized by the 
Federal Government as a source of potential invasive species because they 
have climates and habitats similar to those of the United States, they are 
home to a large variety of species that (unlike European species) have not 
been cultivated in the United States, and their volume of trade with the 
United States has increased signiﬁ  cantly (Mack et al., 2002, p. 37). Based on 
the types of goods interdicted, it appears that illegally traded foods are most 
commonly discovered in ethnic food markets. The expansion of U.S. immi-
gration in the 1990s, as well as the rise in food imports from China over the 
last 20 years, may have encouraged the growth of Asian ethnic food markets 
that support this trade. 
The degree to which inspection and interdiction evidence is gathered is likely 
to depend on the ease with which smuggled goods are discovered. Inspectors 
and SITC ofﬁ  cers may be more likely to identify contraband material if it 
is subject to a comprehensive ban based on the material’s country of origin 
rather than just based on a region within a country. Frequently interdicted 
goods, such as szechuan pepper from China, fall under this criterion. Also, 
China has hosted two particularly large threats to U.S. agriculture—avian 
inﬂ  uenza and citrus diseases—that may have caused inspectors to pay closer 
attention to imports from China than from other countries.   
Table 5
Total interdicted material and total agricultural 















1 China 2,342,640 8,038,360 0.0291
2 Japan 374,562 2,063,320 0.0182
3 India 281,724 4,182,607 0.0068
4 South Korea 232,800 964,699 0.0241
5 Mexico 207,241 36,802,361 0.0006
6 Taiwan 184,844 904,963 0.0204
7 Thailand 136,705 5,171,291 0.0026
8 U.S. (domestic) 123,828 Not applicable Not applicable
9 Canada 58,817 57,791,976 0.0001
10 Vietnam 56,261 1,731,613 0.0033
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance (SITC) Quarterly Report (2002-06).17 
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Analysis of USDA Targeted Inspections Data 
The outcomes of targeted agricultural inspections are collected in APHIS’s 
PPQ 280 database, which is publicly available under the Freedom of 
Information Act. PPQ 280 data reveal the types of good, origin, quantity, 
and disposition code for plant agricultural goods physically inspected in the 
course of their importation to the United States. The disposition code indicates 
whether the shipment was inspected and whether pests were detected, but 
it does not indicate whether cargo concealed smuggled goods. Even if such 
distinctions were available, however, estimated percentages of goods that are 
smuggled would be biased upward because targeted inspections are oriented 
toward finding the maximum amount of prohibited material. Targeting factors 
and intensity of inspection efforts are not available in the data.
Using data from 1996 and 2006, this study isolates five disposition codes16 that 
suggest that smuggling is being attempted,17 including three codes for products 
that are prohibited and destroyed, returned, or assigned another action; one 
code for products destroyed due to a discrepancy with the shipment’s phyto-
sanitary certificate; and one code for products that are endangered species and 
sent to a rescue center.18 The sum of these shipments is herein called refused 
shipments. To avoid aggregation problems,19 the focus of this analysis is on 
refused shipments of fruits and vegetables only. Table 6 provides findings for 
the top five countries ranked in terms of cumulative refused shipments of fruits 
and vegetables. 
While Mexico has the largest amount of refused fruits and vegetables, it is also 
the largest source of fruit and vegetable imports to the United States. Mexico 
and China lead other nations in the number of shipments refused. While the 
rate of refusal for China is noticeably larger than that for Mexico, it is actually 
smaller than that for Argentina and Brazil. Inspection data do not allow for a 
specific estimation of the size of smuggling but do indicate the types of goods 
that are refused because of suspected smuggling. These include citrus goods, 
tropical fruits (including papaya and mango), and ethnic foods (including 
szechuan pepper and ya pears). These varieties also overlap with the types of 
goods interdicted in markets as discussed in the previous section. 
16These codes are DEPP, OTPP, and 
RXPP for the goods that were pro-
hibited products; DEPD for the goods 
rejected for having phyto discrepancies; 
and ESRC for goods confiscated for 
being endangered species.
17Although APHIS staff indicate 
that attempting to import prohibited 
goods is suggestive of smuggling, 
import shipments may still receive 
these disposition codes when the goods 
are correctly manifested.  Typically, 
APHIS does not consider goods as 
being smuggled unless there is intent to 
conceal the true contents.
18The relatively small number of en-
dangered plant species include orchids, 
cacti, and cycads.
19Cut flower and propagative mate-
rial imports are measured in stems and 
plant units rather than by weight and 
are difficult to interpret in terms of 
volume
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Top three goods refused, by number  
of shipments
Number Kilograms Kilograms
Mexico 1,418 8,346,009 3,952,110,724 Papaya (104), pepper (98),  
mango (97)
China 433 2,345,872 275,379,712 Citrus (130), szechuan pepper (104), 
ya pear (80)
Argentina 84 896,885 78,688,222 Citrus (24), mango (10), pear (5)
Brazil 74 1,129,368 103,591,410 Mango (42), papaya (12), citrus (9)
Spain 70 563,572 82,275,346 Pepper (31), citrus (21), cucumber (10)
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service PPQ 280 data (1996-2006) and U.S. 
Census Bureau data (2006).18 
The Economics of Agricultural and Wildlife Smuggling / ERR-81  
Economic Research Service/USDA
Analysis of U.S. Fish and Wildlife  
Service Targeted Inspections Data 
FWS (2005) used goods refused at import to characterize illegally traded 
wildlife goods based on entries in FWS’s Law Enforcement Management 
Information System (LEMIS) declaration subsystem during 2000-04. The 
study explicitly acknowledged the known biases previously mentioned with 
APHIS inspections data. Refusals consist of goods that were given the dispo-
sition codes of seized, abandoned, or re-exported. While abandoned and 
re-exported goods suggest that trade might have been inadvertent, inspec-
tors indicate that these goods are actually being traded illegally. The data 
collected through LEMIS are divided into the following taxonomic groups:  
reptiles, mammals, birds, mollusks, fish, coral, insects, amphibians, echino-
derms, arachnids, crustaceans, and invertebrates. LEMIS data contain records 
on the number of goods imported each year as distinguished by country of 
origin, intended purpose (personal, commercial, hunting), estimated value 
(when possible), species, and size of shipment. Unlike goods under the PPQ 
280 system, where the pest risk may be unknown when the good is imported, 
goods refused under the LEMIS system are known to be prohibited from 
entry into the United States.  
Total refusals of wildlife goods in LEMIS data are disaggregated by purpose 
as follows: 61 percent for personal, 33 percent for commercial, 5 percent 
for hunting, and less than 2 percent for other reasons. Though the share of 
personal shipments refused each year (24 percent) is considerably higher than 
that of commercial shipments (1 percent) (FWS, 2005, p. 133), FWS does 
not distinguish between commercial and personal shipments in its detailed 
data reporting. The average refusal rate for all wildlife shipments was consis-
tent at around 2.5 percent per year between 2000 and 2004, which includes 
both personal and cargo shipments. Note that about 24 percent of all wildlife 
shipments are inspected.20 From the LEMIS data, it is difficult to determine 
the SPS risks posed by illegally traded wildlife. Certain types of frequently 
traded wildlife goods, such as animal leather, bones, and shells, are likely to 
pose a relatively small threat. Conversely, nonthreatened wildlife entering 
the United States legally may pose an SPS risk without causing a resource 
risk because quarantine and disease inspection measures are inadequate (for 
example, deer transported by U.S. hunters returning from Canada21). 
Based on refusals in LEMIS data, the wildlife goods entering the United 
States with the highest percentage of refused entry are reptiles, coral, birds, 
and echinoderms (including starfish and sea cucumbers) (table 7). High 
refusal percentages for these goods are associated with a small volume of 
imports. This suggests that importers refrain from trading goods with a high 
probability of detection. 
Based on primary use of refused goods, the following is evident. First, 
refused goods tend to be goods that are high in value relative to their size and 
might be characterized as luxuries, such as boots and shoes produced with 
alligator or crocodile leather, jewelry, and traditional medicines. Caviar was 
recently added to the CITES list of restricted species after Caspian Sea stocks 
grew extremely depleted, and illegal trade in caviar has been particularly 
problematic. Second, for most animal categories (except birds), the meat and 
20Isolating commercial shipments 
to arrive only from air cargo, ocean 
cargo, mail, rail, or truck changes this 
figure from 24 to 25 percent (FWS, 
2005, pg. 137).
21USDA enacted several restrictions 
on Canadian wildlife imports after the 
2003 discovery of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy in a Canadian dairy cow.19 
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live animal trade represents a relatively small portion of illegal trade, which 
is significant if these items have a greater SPS risk than other wildlife prod-
ucts, such as jewelry, leather, bone, and skin products.
Table 8 shows total refused wildlife imports as a proportion of total legal 
wildlife  imports by country. The data do not distinguish between cargo and 
passenger shipments. Excluding the totals for Laos and Azerbaijan (whose 
wildlife trade is extremely small), Mexico is shown to have the highest rate 
of refusal of wildlife goods (and total number of refusals), but this finding is 
likely the result of the large amount of passenger travel between the United 
States and Mexico.22 After China, the percentage refused falls to 4.8 percent 
for Vietnam, the 11th-ranked country, whereas the median refusal rate for all 
countries is 4.0 percent. In terms of total refusals, Mexico, China, and Russia 
rank first, third, and sixth, respectively. For Mexico and Nicaragua, refused 
goods typically include live birds and snakes and leather products made 
22FWS (2005, p. 128) also notes that 
“the high number and rate of refusal 
(28.1 percent) for imports from Mexico 
is largely due to the strict prohibitions 
against export of most wildlife without 
permits, coupled with a vibrant trade in 
a variety of protected species products 
such as reptile skin boots.”
Table 7
Number of wildlife shipments refused in FWS LEMIS data, 5-year totals (2000-04)
Category
Total 







Primary uses of  
refused products
                        --------------------------------------- Number ---------------------------------------      Percent
Reptiles 85,379 3,255 1,267 641 5,163 90,542 5.7 Leather products, shoes 
Coral 19,021 611 407 105 1,123 20,144 5.6 Raw and live coral
Birds 48,141 1,213 467 402 2,082 50,223 4.1 Live birds, feathers, trophies
Echino-
derms
2,249 27 39 8 74 2,323 3.2 Bodies,* shells*
Mammals 218,353 3,146 1,322 528 4,996 223,349 2.2 Medicinals, skins, ivory
Fish 146,398 1,014 513 129 1,656 148,054 1.1 Caviar, live fish,* meat*
Mollusks  155,317 858 438 454 1,750 157,067 1.1 Shells for jewelry
All others 132,786 267 150 87 504 133,290 0.4
*Most of these products were regulated under domestic and foreign laws other than the Convention for the Trade of Endangered Species or the 
Endangered Species Act. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), “U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade” (2005, p. 6, table 7).
Table 8
Total refused shipments of wildlife by country of origin, 5-year totals (2000-04) 
Rank
Country of 





                                           ------------------------------------------------ Number -----------------------------------------------              Percent
1 Laos 41 11 25 202 279 238 85.3
2 Azerbaijan 41 55 1 63 160 119 74.4
3 Mexico 9,641 1,743 229 1,800 13,413 3,772 28.1
4 Russia 2,149 252 13 297 2,711 562 20.7
5 Nigeria 1,415 151 7 165 1,738 323 18.6
6 Nicaragua 776 17 23 111 927 151 16.3
7 El Salvador 1,240 46 3 131 1,420 180 12.7
8 Unknown 904 61 49 14 1,028 124 12.1
9 Marshall 
Islands
844 2 2 98 946 102 10.8
10 China 15,555 264 178 696 16,693 1,138 6.8
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade” (2005, p. 129, table 35).20 
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from reptile skin. In these cases, the movement of live animals is of special 
concern, especially among birds, due to the potential of these animals to 
introduce diseases and pathogens into the United States. For China, refused 
goods often include traditional medicinal products made from a variety of 
animals as noted in Henry (2004) and Von Hippel and Von Hippel (2002). 
Refused goods from Russia often include caviar. 
The proportion of the monetary value of the illegal wildlife trade to that of 
all wildlife trade is approximately 0.4 percent based on refusal data after 
correcting for data anomalies (table 9).23 As with APHIS inspections data, if 
targeting occurs across the type of good imported, its origin, and its arrival 
conveyance, this estimate will be biased upward.
However, no further adjustment is made to correct for this potential bias for 
several reasons. Unlike agricultural inspections, wildlife goods inspections 
are more specifically directed at uncovering illicit trade, making the reported 
rates of interception much more reliable. Little correlation exists in refusal 
and inspection rates across transport methods, which indicate that alternative 
transports likely receive the same level of scrutiny. Based on the number of 
shipments, a larger percentage (around 1 percent) of inspected commercial 
import entries than personal entries is refused (FWS, 2005, p. 133). Finally, 
there is no obvious manner in which this bias might be corrected. 
23In table 9, “lines refused” refers to 
shipment entries refused.  “Share with 
no value” refers to the percentage of 
imports that have no recorded import 
value because they cannot be legally 
sold (FWS, 2005, p. 122). 
Table 9










Share with   
no value All shipments value
Share of total 
refused
Number Dollars Percent Number Dollars Percent Dollars Percent
2000 4,510 5,371,5621 26.4 259,629 1,702,763,815 11.0 1,713,435,377 0.6
2001 4,352 6,607,5992 22.2 310,508 1,468,274,339 10.1 1,475,381,938 0.5
2002 4,467 4,467,893 21.8 340,300 1,356,102,306 8.8 1,360,570,199 0.3
2003 4,712 4,381,595 28.5 375,200 1,512,419,944 9.2 1,516,801,539 0.3
2004 4,824 4,056,743 27.1 378,524 1,766,764,3993 6.6 2,770,821,142 0.2
Total 30,685,392 8,806,324,803 8,837,010,196 0.4
1Excludes an outlier for ivory in 2000 valued at $5.3 million. 
2Excludes an outlier for caviar in 2001 valued at $0.5 million.  
3Excludes an outlier for a panda bear in 2004 value at $1 billion. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “U.S. Illegal Wildlife Trade” (2005, p. 121, table 31).
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The Characteristics of Agricultural and Wildlife Goods  
This analysis supports three general conclusions. First, illegally traded 
agricultural goods are not those conventionally sold in supermarkets but 
tend to be specialty items with a high value relative to their size. Food 
items interdicted by APHIS are more likely to be ethnic foods and spices, 
such as szechuan pepper (a citrus-based spice), tejocotes (a Mexican crab 
apple), and ya pear (an Asian pear variety). Inspections data corroborate 
this finding somewhat, with szechuan pepper and ya pear being frequently 
found, along with citrus and high-value tropical fruits, including mango and 
papaya. Second, illegally traded wildlife goods are likely to be luxury items 
to be used for jewelry, reptile-leather shoes, and other products; caviar; and 
medicinal goods. Third, Mexico and China represent a large percentage of 
the detected illegal trade for wildlife and agricultural goods, respectively, 
though biological and geographical factors may help account for the different 
percentages across countries. 22 
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Conclusions 
The recent passage of the Plant Protection Act and the Animal Health 
Protection Act reflects the ongoing concern in the United States over sanitary 
and phytosanitary concerns and resource risk in an era of increasing agri-
cultural and wildlife imports and recent costly episodes of invasive species 
introductions. Inspections of imports play a crucial role in risk management, 
and U.S. inspection agencies have undergone significant consolidation since 
the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2003. 
Several findings emerge from the examination of import refusals and 
interdiction data from APHIS and FWS. Illegal agricultural imports are 
driven primarily by specialty markets for ethnic foods and may reflect the 
general idiosyncrasies of agricultural trade prohibitions and enforcement. 
Illegal wildlife imports are driven by the trade in luxury items and jewelry, 
including leather products; culturally specific traditional medicines; ivory; 
caviar; and shell jewelry. These types of imports are also likely to command 
high prices relative to their cost and size, which is not surprising given the 
profit motive of smuggling. 
Smuggling of wildlife into the United States is most prevalent with Mexico, 
and smuggling of agricultural products is most prevalent with China. Both 
countries are major trade partners with the United States, and U.S. imports 
from both increased dramatically over the last 25 years. Similarly, immigra-
tion may have increased the prevalence of ethnic food, traditional goods, and 
medicinal goods that seem to be especially associated with illegal trade. In 
terms of size, detected illegal trade seems to be a significant part of the total 
wildlife trade and a smaller but nontrivial part of the agricultural trade. Based 
on the fragmentary inspection evidence, the illegal wildlife trade is approxi-
mately 1 percent of commercial wildlife shipments and 0.4 percent of the 
total value of the wildlife trade. Based on fragmentary interdiction evidence, 
the illegal agricultural trade has a lower bound of approximately 0.03 percent 
of total agricultural trade for China, which had the highest reported propor-
tions and volumes. Still, these figures, along with most widely reported 
public estimates, are inexact due to the potential for bias in the data. 
Concerns over smuggling extend beyond risks surrounding invasive species 
or endangered wildlife. Expertise across different fields, including interna-
tional law, criminology, economics, agricultural sciences, pathology, and 
environmental science, is necessary to formulate an impartial and compre-
hensive regulatory and enforcement regime. Idiosyncratic factors influence 
the need for individual regulations, yet the nature of inspections and border 
security has necessitated that risks from imports—SPS, resource, or other 
national security interests—be addressed in a unified manner. A better under-
standing of the incentives to smuggle goods is emerging and will aid further 
research efforts as markets and supply chains become more integrated. 23 
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